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Abstract: How do we learn the link between speech and money? What is the process of formation that 
legitimates the logic whereby speech is equivalent to money? What are the experiences, events, and subjectivities 
that render the connection between currency and speaking/listening intuitive? As educators and researchers, 
what do we do and say to shore up this connection, and—as we may be inclined—are there things we can do or 
say to loosen it? Educational discourse theory, specifically examining classroom discussion, is one of the most 
prominent arenas of educational research where the equivalence between money and speech is active. While it 
may seem tautological to say that “discussion is an exchange of ideas,” it is not trivial to do so. Definitions of 
discussion in both reference and academic texts use the word “exchange” for discussion like Kant would use the 
word “unmarried” to define a bachelor. Yet the exchange case carries connotations and denotations that the 
bachelor case does not. There is more to say about it. Take this one small case—whether discussion is an 
exchange of ideas—as a part of the more general inquiry about education and money/speech. Discussions 
happen throughout classrooms and other educational contexts in society, and the phrase most likely passes 
person-to-person in such a way as to make it obvious that what is happening in the discussion is an exchange, 
perhaps making it equally obvious that money and speech are equivalent. In other words, the claim in this 
article is that continually referring to discussion as an exchange of ideas teaches that speech and money are 
equivalent, a proposition that has serious political consequences. It is not obviously the case that discussion is an 
exchange of ideas, as I will show, and demonstrating this with a careful philosophical comb can go some distance 
towards showing (and therefore teaching) that money is not equivalent to speech.  
 
 
Money talks, talk is cheap, and ideas are exchanged in marketplaces as part of the knowledge economy. 
While these are small turns of phrase, the idea behind them—that money is speech1—can be highly 
prized. The United States Supreme Court made the following decision in Buckley v. Valeo in 1976:  
 
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a 
campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, 
the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached. 
  
                                                
1 I write “speech” rather than “discourse” to signal an interest in talking, listening, and communicating rather than 
the wider arena of meanings, epistemologies, and symbols (a subset of discourse). For a good look at money and 
discourse, particularly in the poststructuralist tradition, see Suzuki (2001). On the wider arena of critical discourse 
analysis see Fairclough (2004). 
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In this case, while money is not identified with the act of exchange, currency is “necessarily” related to 
the “quantity of expression.” A quantity of money is a quantity of speech such that limiting the former 
is equivalent to limiting the latter. This 1976 decision was the main precedent for the recent 2010 
decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, which, under the aegis of free speech, permits 
institutions such as corporations to spend unlimited amounts of money in political campaigns in the 
USA. A more recent case threatened to change the landscape of workers’ rights even further, coming 
from the world of schooling: Friedrichs vs. California Teachers Association boiled down to a question of 
whether money is speech. In this case, the specific issue was whether being charged agency fees violates 
free speech if the payer does not agree with a union’s policies or negotiations; in other words, whether 
being compelled to pay money to an organization which does not represent one’s values is a violation 
of free speech. A split court prevented a decision one way or the other on this issue, permitting public 
sector unions access to crucial funding for their operations. But in a future court this access could very 
well be limited, all because—in some way—payment is speech.  
There are important educational questions to ask about this link between speech and money. How 
do we learn the link between speech and money? What is the process of formation which legitimates 
the logic whereby speech is equivalent to money? What are the experiences, events, and subjectivities 
which render the connection between currency and speaking/listening intuitive? As educators and 
researchers, what do we do and say to shore up this connection, and—as we may be inclined—are 
there things we can do or say to loosen it?  
Certainly, the court decisions above rely on a “fusion of money and speech,” or what the cultural 
theorist R. W. Greene (2007) calls “money/speech.” While a helpful term, money/speech hides some 
subtleties in the proposition that money is speech. There are at least two distinct ways to understand 
this proposition. First, one can say that money is identical to speech, which would mean that any given 
case of money is a case of speech and any given case of speech is money. If it is money, then it is 
speech and vice versa. This identity between money and speech is quite strong. Second, one can say 
that money is equivalent to speech, which is more flexible. Drawing an equivalency between money and 
speech means claiming that either money is speech or speech is money, but not both. In some cases, 
speech is money and in some cases money is speech, but not in all cases for either; or speech and 
money can have closely related meanings and usages in utterance, though they are not identical. I will 
proceed in the following article to critique the educational implications of the weaker, more flexible 
notion that that money is equivalent to speech.  
Educational discourse theory, specifically examining classroom discussion, is one of the most 
prominent arenas of educational research where the equivalence between money and speech is active. 
While it may seem tautological to say that “discussion is an exchange of ideas” it is not trivial to do so.2 
Definitions of discussion in both reference and academic texts use the word exchange for discussion 
like Kant would use the word unmarried to define a bachelor.3 Yet the exchange case carries 
connotations and denotations that the bachelor case does not. There is more to say about it. Take this 
one small case—whether discussion is an exchange of ideas—as a part of the more general inquiry 
about education and money/speech. Discussions happen throughout classrooms and other educational 
                                                
2 Greene (2007) gives the name “Money/Speech” to the political “fusion of money and speech.” We will examine 
the political connotations in what follows.  
3 See Quine (1951). Given the scope of this essay, I should point out that “using” a word is another interesting 
case warranting ideologemic analysis. 
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contexts in society, and the phrase most likely passes person-to-person in such a way as to make it 
obvious that what is happening at the discussion is an exchange, perhaps making it equally obvious that 
money and speech are equivalent. In other words, the claim in this article is that continually referring to 
discussion as an exchange of ideas teaches that speech and money are equivalent, a proposition that has 
serious political consequences. It is not obviously the case that discussion is an exchange of ideas, as I 
will show, and demonstrating this with a careful philosophical comb can go some distance towards 
showing (and therefore teaching) that money is not equivalent to speech.  
 
 
The Absurdity of Discussion as Exchange 
 
Consider Georg Simmel’s (2004) argument in The Philosophy of Money that exchange requires sacrifice. 
Let us say Bob exchanges something with Pam. Both must yield something and gain something else if 
they are in an exchange. Bob and Pam sacrifice something to get whatever it is they get from one 
another. For Simmel, exchange requires such loss, subtraction, or depletion (in both private and public 
goods).4 But in a discussion this is clearly not the case, at least with respect to the things one is meant to 
exchange during the alleged exchange of ideas. If Bob and Pam have a discussion, they speak and listen 
to one another in turns. They each make noises while the other listens. They think. They learn or come 
to a certain decision, or quarrel. But neither of them, in the discussion qua speaking and listening, has 
sacrificed anything. Certainly qua time, attention, leverage, and taking the floor they have made 
sacrifices: Bob and Pam “spent” an hour talking and listening, and (if traditional gender roles are active 
in the hypothetical) Pam spent more time listening to Bob, who “took” more turns. They sacrifice time, 
energy, and attention during the discussion, no doubt. Perhaps they even sacrifice leverage or access to 
information as they speak by omitting certain “pieces of information.”5 But the proposition that 
discussion is an exchange of ideas does not say discussion is an exchange of time, energy, leverage, and 
attention. It says that the discussion itself is an exchange of ideas.  
In legal terms, discussion is considered pure speech, whereas these other things—time, energy, 
etcetera—are speech-related conducts and behaviors. Money/speech equivalency, and the particular 
phrase under consideration about discussion, compels us to say that Bob and Pam exchange the very 
stuff of speaking and listening in their pure speech: what is said and understood. This is clearly not true. 
In terms of speaking, listening, and understanding (if we admit that speaking, listening, and 
understanding are the kind of things that can be “had,” which is also tautological but not trivial), Bob 
and Pam each come away with both what they had and what they may have “gained” from the 
discussion (insofar as one "gains" from speaking and listening). In terms of speaking, listening, and 
understanding, they have not sacrificed anything. Rather they have “given” each other “something” and 
“retained” it at the same time, increasing their holdings while depleting them in a way that renders the 
economic analogy nonsensical. The same holds for any “loss” of held beliefs. If one changes one’s 
mind during discussion, has a transformative epiphany, we might express this experience as a loss—but 
                                                
4 There are notions of exchange which do not necessitate subtraction. These are “non-economic” notions which I 
deal with later. 
5 I would like to thank a reviewer for this point about leverage.  
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one has not lost anything. One still understands the old belief, but no longer endorses it. A feeling of 
loss during education, such as melancholia, is a different phenomenon altogether.6  
In any case, the economic analogy to discussion is clearly absurd. It is impossible to exchange ideas 
during discussion. If it were possible, the following would also be possible: Bob buys a sandwich from 
Pam, but Bob gets to keep his money and the sandwich while Pam is fully compensated for the 
sandwich and gets to keep the bread, meat, and toppings and other sandwich resources, as well as the 
labor time it took her to make the sandwich. It does not make sense. Wright would call the proposition 
that discussion is an exchange of ideas a “blunderbuss formula”: nonsensical and lacking in basic 
subtlety (Wright, 1976, p. 1010). 
 
Discussion as Exchange in Educational Literatures 
 
Yet the proposition that discussion is an exchange of ideas remains entirely sensible, particularly in 
the tradition of theoretical and analytic writing about educational discussion. Consider the following  
passages. The list is a cross-section taken from texts about educational discussion. They were selected 
from among books and articles widely cited in the literature on educational theory, discussion, and 
dialogue. I do not mean to say (yet) that the word “exchange” in each of the following has a particular 
meaning, only to note that the word is present and to provide a launchpad for analysis. 
 
[D]ialogue is an “exchange of speech acts between two partners in a turn-taking sequence aimed at a 
collective goal. (Walton, 1992, p. 25) 
 
[D]iscussion is scarcely a narrow term. It is confusingly used to denote any number and variety of 
exchanges. (Dillon, 1994, p. 6)  
 
In addition, if students feel that their opinions or answers are being judged by a teacher, they can quickly 
become disengaged in a discussion. To prevent this, teachers must encourage a free exchange of ideas. 
(Hulan, 2010, p. 2010).  
 
As one speaks with others in the community, one discovers the community’s patterns of response to 
what one says. … Through these exchanges, conclusions are drawn and actions are determined. 
(Haroutunian-Gordon, 1998, p. 14)  
 
A conversation is an exchange: of feelings, of thoughts, of information, of understandings. (Lipman, 
2003, p. 87) 
 
[D]ialogue can work as a written as well as spoken exchange. (Brookfield & Preskill, 2012, p. 14)  
 
[B]etween two friends [talking] about their relations with their respective families … I label this kind of 
exchange a conversation. (Burbules, 1993, p. 112)  
 
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the 
accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. (Grice, 1975/2000, p. 52)  
                                                
6 Again, I thank my reviewer for this example of the lost belief. For more on melancholia during discussion see 
Backer (2017). 
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Every conversation presupposes a common language, or better, creates a common language. Something 
is placed in the center, as the Greeks say, which the partners in dialogue both share, and concerning 
which they can exchange ideas with one another. (Gadamer, 2004, p. 386) 
 
Do these passages teach that money is equivalent to speech? Let us begin to consider what that would 
mean.  
 
Money and Speech 
 
In “Money: A Speech Act Analysis,” philosopher Peter Hadreas argues that “monetary practices 
may be instructively conceived as cases of linguistic commitments” since they are “a subclass of acts of 
acquisition” that are “necessarily linguistic,” and “failing to consider money within the conversational 
context in which it occurs results in ontological and conceptual errors” (1989, p. 115). He goes on to 
argue that “monetary transactions are linguistic” (p. 117) in the following way. He points out a category 
mistake that treats money and speech as different from one another. The “Quantity Theory of Money” 
casts currency as a substance which occurs in certain sums. However, any occasion of exchange 
requires a set of relations between humans (Hadreas calls them “promissory”) such that the quantity 
theory of money is an abstraction that shifts attention “from the ontology of relations to the ontology 
of substance.” In other words, trying to clearly parse money from speech is problematic because 
relations and substance occur with a simultaneity in this case that might converge on there being a 
distinction without a difference. Money is relations just as much as it is substance.  
 
It is altogether easy to forget that money as amounts of dollars, marks, or yen is nothing unless it allows 
for the requests and promises that these types of currency permit. The fortunes of Getty or the Hunt 
family are nothing unless they allow for the option to enter into a vast scope of promissory relations. 
Indeed, one goal of presenting money within a conversational context has been to indicate how money 
marks promissory relations and how when one loses sight of this context, one typically conceives of 
money as a substance. (p.122) 
 
Money here is “nothing unless it allows for requests and promises” which the currency requires, and is 
“nothing unless” it allows “for the option to enter into a vast scope of promissory relations.” In a 
fascinating turn of phrase, Hadreas claims that “money marks” relations. Every occasion of exchange is 
also an occasion of promissory relations. Money is equivalent to speech in this case because if there is 
money, then there is speech too. If Hadreas is right, then it would appear that limiting any exchange of 
money amounts to limiting an exchange of promises—which would be a violation of free speech.7  
One might then say that discussion is an exchange of ideas because any exchange of currency is an 
exchange of ideas. But here we have to refine the question under consideration: To say that discussion 
is an exchange of ideas is not to say that speech is equivalent to money such that any exchange of 
money is an exchange of speech, but rather that speech is equivalent to money such that speaking and 
listening is an exchange of ideas like the exchange of objects or currency. It is one thing to say that 
when one speaks, one exchanges; it is another to say that when one exchanges, one speaks. Hadreas’s 
argument is that money is speech because every money transaction requires, marks, and occasions 
                                                
7 A response to Hadreas, emerging from a claim by Adam Smith, is made at the end of the paper. 
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promises. Yet this differs from the claim that every speech action requires, marks, and occasions 
something like a money transaction. Saying that discussion is an exchange of ideas is not saying that an 
exchange of currency for goods and services always marks a discussion that must occur for the 
exchange to go forward. With Hadreas’s argument, we cannot conclude that discussion is an exchange 
of ideas. Certainly it is instructive to think about the ways in which money is linguistic, but money being 
linguistic is different than language being economic. Propositions that teach that money is equivalent to 
speech (like saying or writing that discussion is an exchange of ideas) are instructive in a different way: 
they teach that speaking and listening have economic significance, specifically of currency.  
There are yet more layers to peel away here. It is problematic to say that all exchanges are 
exchanges of money, or even economic. Claiming that learning and teaching through discussion is an 
exchange of ideas shores up the link between speech and money presumes that exchange is an 
economic activity limited to the circulation of currency. There are the other possible ways to 
understand exchange in this proposition. Given these other perspectives, does the proposition take on 
a different significance than the money-meaning already attributed to it? Do these other perspectives 
make it more sensical? Further, are these perspectives convincing enough to prohibit the attribution of 
money-meaning to the proposition? What are the different ways exchange can be understood in the 
proposition that discussion is an exchange of ideas? Perhaps we are not teaching and learning the 
connection between speech and money by uttering that proposition, but rather the connection between 
speech and sharing, reciprocity, or participation.  
There may still be more reasons not to even ask the question: the political potency of an idiomatic 
phrase may itself be vacuous. Is a turn of phrase like “discussion is an exchange of ideas” political at 
all? For sake of argument let us assume there is some political unconscious to this proposition, using 
Frederic Jameson’s (1981) term. Jameson’s notion requires that the political unconscious of a text 
indicate a capitalist “proto-narrative,” a fragment of capitalist ideology emerging from the author’s or 
speaker’s situation within a contradiction of capitalism. Reading the political unconscious means finding 
ideologemes, discrete instances of language or discourse which betray one's immersion in a particular 
politics. The term “ideologeme” is a more specific way to refer to such instances. It was introduced as a 
neologism by Valentin Volosinov (1973) and taken up by Julia Kristeva (1986) and Pavel Medvedev 
(1978), and was intended in a more general way to signify how language both determines and is 
determined by social life. Thinking about the proposition as an ideologeme with a political unconscious 
begins to make sense of the view that it does have a general political importance. 
Language for Volosinov reflects and refracts society, registering the material conditions of 
existence as well as the discursive trends surrounding the speaker. For Volosinov, our social life is 
awash with language. He uses water metaphors to describe this relationship. The structures of social life 
both shape the flow and current of language and those structures themselves are shaped by language, 
like land and water. The land is a surface guiding the water while the water shapes the land. Volosinov, 
a Russian linguist writing in the years just after the 1917 revolution and identifying as a Marxist, is 
interested in examining language’s relationship to economics. The text from which these ideas about 
language emerge does not insist, like many critical-theoretical texts today might, that capitalism is always 
the most prominent and active agent. Rather the social life of speakers itself is the agent/entity which 
imbues signs with meaning, which includes the material conditions of existence in an important way, 
but also includes other aspects like culture or anything in what is known as the “superstructure”: law, 
science, religion, poetry. For example, when someone says they want to “plug into” an event or group, 
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“network” to get ahead in their professional career, or “interface” with one another in person, their 
language registers the influence of computer technology on social life. When a writer says they will 
“deploy” a concept, “take a shot in the dark,” or “launch” a critique, the language is registering the 
influence of military action. Raymond Williams’s (1977, 1985) approach to the politics of language is a 
contemporary example of Volosinov’s theory, and the proposition that discussion is an exchange of 
ideas would most likely elicit a political-economic analysis from this tradition of authors. 
But others might not accept the political unconscious of the statement, and perhaps ideologemic 
analysis in general. If the word exchange is part of an imaginary, as Michelle LeDeouff (2000) argues, 
there is no political intention in its usage. Imaginaries slip into discourse without explicit argumentation, 
have  a powerful affective resonance, and engage in a kind of straightforward dogmatization by 
instituting an emblem in the discourse, yet LeDouff claims that such imaginaries cannot have political 
significance because it would entail an impossible intentionality. Language is too rife with complexity 
for any set of interests to guide such usages. If we think of the proposition as a move in a language-
game that is part of our form of life, as late Wittgensteinians would claim, we might also say there is no 
politics in the phrase—it is just a move in a game played by some speakers to do certain things, some of 
which might be political, but maybe not. There is also the possibility that the discussion–exchange 
proposition is a metaphor we live by, as Lakoff and Johnson observe, and that the metaphor of 
exchange maps roughly to the kind of reciprocal sharing/giving of time, energy, space, and attention 
mentioned earlier, and also to the sensation (expressed by the metaphor but lacking in any political 
import) of coming away from a discussion with more than one had before. If the proposition is just a 
metaphor we live by, then claiming it has a political unconscious would be making the issue a “bigger 
deal” than necessary, so to speak.  
There are responses to these responses, though. To the LeDoueffians, I would argue that the 
utterance of “exchange” in the proposition that discussion is an exchange of ideas is not quite an 
imaginary, since it is not uttered for the purposes of philosophical argumentation. Whereas Kant uses 
ocean and island imaginaries in the Critique of Pure Reason to communicate things about the individual, 
for instance, the ubiquity and by-definition status of exchange with respect to discussion is a different 
type of phenomenon. No single person is arguing anything in particular with the utterance, yet the 
utterance could be a social-collective registration of successful arguments over time. Also, the political 
significance of a proposition need not be entirely intentional. Social structures are reproduced, at least 
partly, through utterances supporting the continuity of social relations in ways that no one speaker or 
group of speakers intend specifically, though these utterances may serve the interests of a group of 
speakers. Capitalists benefit when speech and money are equivalent, because such an understanding 
manufactures consent to an economic arrangement that privileges their interests. There may not be any 
one or two capitalists plotting behind a curtain to maintain this power, but the perpetuation of capitalist 
social relations occurs structurally through a language that registers the vindication of a capitalist agenda 
over time. Thinking about discussion as an exchange might be both evidence and maintenance of this 
vindication. The response, though worded differently, is adequate for Lakoff and Johnson’s (2008) 
position as well. While exchange may be a metaphor, not referring exactly to exchange but rather 
something like exchange, the utterance can still have a political-economic significance—particularly 
since we live by it.  
To the Wittgensteinians, I would respond by echoing Jean-Francois Lyotard’s (1984) argument in 
The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge that ideological interests determine the rules of language 
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games. Lyotard claims in that book that there is a general agonistics in language games: a struggle over 
what rules will be put in place; a battle between those who accept a consensus and those who do not 
accept, or are not initiated into, that consensus. The burden of proof in this case is on the 
Wittgensteinians to show that the process by which the rules of language games emerge is not political. 
All of which is to say that it is reasonable to consider the discussion–exchange proposition as an 
ideologeme with a political unconscious in Jameson’s terms. (At this point I will write the term 
“discussion–exchange ideologeme” to name the thing under consideration: the proposition that 
discussion is an exchange of ideas as a particular educational case of speech-money equivalency.) What 
is the political unconscious of this ideologeme? It could be economic or non-economic, and if it is 
economic then it could be capitalist or non-capitalist.  
There are utterances of exchange which are not necessarily economic. When chemists and 
biologists speak of carbon exchange as a transfer of substances, does the word carry an economic 
connotation? Carbon trading and carbon markets are explicitly economic, but in talking about the back-
and-forth interchange of substances there is nothing economic present in the connotations or 
denotations of the statement, just a to-and-fro movement of material in space and time. Yet if the 
discussion–exchange ideologeme means to say that material or substances go to-and-fro in space and 
time, we have already seen that nothing qua speaking, listening, and understanding goes to-and-fro or 
back-and-forth during discussion. Turns, time, and attention go back and forth, but when people speak 
and listen they are making noises that each of them hears, reacting to them as they listen, and continue 
to make noises. Simmel’s principle of sacrifice is also relevant to mention again. In the carbon exchange 
example, there would also be some depletion in the transfer of material. In the speaking and listening 
case, there is neither such transfer nor depletion. When Pam says something, she makes a noise and the 
soundwaves go towards Bob, but there is no material depletion in her doing so. She does not have a 
quantity of soundwaves available to her that, when she speaks, are depleted or sacrificed. In a chemical 
reaction, certain substances are used up and change over time.8 This is not the case with speaking and 
listening qua speaking and listening. So it could be safe to say that the exchange in the discussion–
exchange proposition is not non-economic, since it does not match the chemical/biological meaning.  
If we make the jump to say that the ideologeme does have an economic meaning of exchange, we 
can still understand what economic means in different ways, such that the discussion–exchange 
ideologeme is not economic in one particular sense. Lionel Robbins (1935) understands economics as a 
human relationship between ends and scarce means, whereas Arthur Pigou (2013) claims economics is 
only what can be measured by money. The former is a more open definition of the economic whereas 
the latter is closed. There is also a sense in which discussion as an exchange of ideas has nothing to do 
with money but is still economic. Gabriel Tarde (1898/1969) speculated in the late nineteenth century 
that the language of giving and the language of talking/listening mixed when those in inferior social 
positions went to visit those in superior social positions to talk business, and it was customary to bring 
gifts as part of the official discussion. In this sense the notion that a discussion is an exchange of ideas 
is a linguistic remnant of gifting exchange, which means it is still economic but has nothing to do with 
market activity—although what counts a gift is debatable.9 This Tardian point is a pre-capitalist 
                                                
8 Exploring ideas of information and matter in the field of physics would be of particular interest here, particularly 
whether matter can be created or destroyed, and whether information is matter.  
9 See Mauss (1954) and Derrida (1992). 
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ideologemic analysis, in which the discussion–exchange ideologeme is economic but related to neither 
currency nor the economic arrangement where exchange-value is a predominant form of value.  
Given that there are available arguments to the contrary, namely gifting and reciprocity, what 
arguments are there that the political unconscious of the discussion–exchange ideologeme has to do 
with money? Karl Marx’s theory of money in Capital states that money is just the expression or 
manifestation of a general equivalent which permits any kind of exchange, no matter the mode of 
production. In other words, there is some standard of value according to which it makes sense to 
exchange X for Y, or even when giving a gift, though not Derrida's sense. Money is just the expression 
of this general equivalent, such that the reciprocity and sharing mentioned in the pre-capitalist 
arguments above still relate to currency, but in a different, more protean way. In other words, even if 
the discussion–exchange ideologeme operates on a pre-capitalist notion of bartering, sharing, or giving, 
there is still an important presence of exchange-value inherent to the notion. It marks a general 
equivalent according to which a certain object is assigned a quantitative value that can be swapped or 
bartered with other objects. Money, for Marx anyway, is just an expression of this general equivalent—
which is the same thing as exchange-value. Of course, it would be a mistake to claim that gifting 
requires money, but it could also be a mistake to say that there is no exchange-value in a gift. This 
notion approaches the money-centric meaning of exchange in the discussion–exchange ideologeme.  
There are certainly precedents for the money-centric meaning of the ideologeme, going back 
further than the relatively contemporary examples mentioned already. In the Areopagitica, John Milton’s 
tract on free speech, Milton demands that knowledge—and by extension public discussion thereof—
not be thought of in economic terms.  
 
Truth and understanding are not such wares as to be monopolized and traded in by tickets and statutes 
and standards. We must not think to make a staple commodity of all the knowledge in the land, to mark 
and license it like our broadcloth and our woolpacks. (1644/1860, p. 110)  
 
Trying to keep the sacred life of knowledge separate from the base and usurious world of trucking and 
trading, Milton draws a line between speech and money that he thinks should not be crossed. Present in 
this claim is the idea that one can think about truth and understanding as a commodity like broadcloth 
and woolpacks—it might even be easy and appealing—but, according to Milton, it is wrong to associate 
the two because there is something sacred about knowledge. Milton’s argument foreshadows my own 
later on. Contrast it to one staked out much later by Adam Smith. In a 1763 lecture, only a few years 
before he published The Wealth of Nations, he notes that offering a shilling is “in reality” the same thing 
as offering an argument. 
 
If we should enquire into the principle of human mind on which this disposition of trucking is founded, 
it is clearly the natural inclination every one has to persuade. The offering of a shilling, which to us 
appears to have so plain and simple meaning, is in reality offering an argument to persuade one to do so. 
(Smith, 1766/1982, vi.57, p. 352) 
 
This passage is particularly striking10 because Smith notes that his (in)famous anthropological 
assumption about humans’ natural disposition to barter, truck, and exchange is “founded” on the 
“natural inclination every one has to persuade.” While the general scope of Smith’s argument is more 
                                                
10 Again, another ideologeme. Why do ideas “strike” us? 
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about self-interest in bartering, Smith gestures towards the idea that persuasion, a form of talking, is so 
deeply entrenched in human nature that when we pay for something with money, this payment is “in 
reality offering an argument.” The act of giving or exchanging money is founded in talking, such that 
the reality of one is the reality of the other, which is just an older version of Hadreas’s more systematic 
claim in his essay about money as a speech act. In this sense every exchange of goods is an exchange of 
ideas also, at least insofar as it is an exchange of arguments to persuade the other person to go ahead 
with the exchange. Smith and Hadreas might therefore find Milton’s claim unnatural. 
The naturalness of identifying speech with money, the way Smith describes it, is precisely the 
question on the table. If Smith is right, then the U.S. Supreme Court cases above carry water 
philosophically as well as legally: Not permitting someone to spend money on a political campaign is 
the same thing as not permitting them to offer an argument to that effect, and not permitting them to 
offer an argument violates free speech. Looking at this carefully in light of what has been said, though, 
Smith and Hadreas play on the ideologeme.  
Aside from making a strange claim about human nature, Smith identifies speech and listening with 
offering by writing the verb “to offer” with both arguments and shillings. He presumes in his very 
usage that an argument is an offerable thing, just as a shilling is an offerable thing. Bracketing the claim 
about human nature, it is clear that the argument is entirely rhetorical. Smith merely transfers the verb 
“offer” so it works with both subjects: argument and shilling. It is just true, he says, appealing to human 
nature, that offering shillings and offering arguments are the same. One might object that this utterance 
is just a figure of speech, but Smith doubles down on the ontological intensity of the utterance: offering 
a shilling is “in reality” offering an argument. In a way, Smith relies on Hadreas’s central insight—that 
speech is a necessary part of money transactions—to claim that speech is equivalent to money. Yet, 
while money transactions do entail speech relations, speech relations do not entail money transactions. 
Offering an argument is not in reality the same as offering a shilling. While it may be tautological or 
metaphorical to say that an argument is the kind of thing one offers, and it might be in tune with one’s 
pro-capitalist leanings, it is certainly not trivial. If an argument were a situation of offering similar to 
that of offering shillings, then I would no longer have the arguments I offered once I offered them, just 
as I would no longer have the shillings I offered once I offered them. Whether a gifting, bartering, or 
reciprocal transfer of substance—under any of the meanings examined—it does not make sense to say 
that discussion is an exchange of ideas.  
Hadreas includes an argument that could rectify Smith’s claim, however. Hadreas suggests that 
offering a shilling is in reality offering an argument because every exchange of currency is also an 
exchange of promises. Seeing money and speech as two different things, the former of substance and 
the latter of relations, is therefore to make a distinction without a difference. But the argument against 
Smith above can be extended to disagree with Hadreas’s account as well. Certainly speech is antecedent, 
simultaneous, and consequent with exchange. Promises must be in place for an exchange to take place 
and occur during the exchange itself. To claim that they are the same, the ontological claim that Hadreas 
and Smith make, is to claim a sameness in distinction. It is easy to say that an exchange is also an 
exchange of promises, but just because we can conjugate the verb “exchange” to refer to speech does 
not mean that it is sensical or good to do so. Promises may be necessary and sufficient for exchange, 
but it does not mean that promises are exchanged.11 While the exchange of money requires, marks, and 
                                                
11 In terms of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding speech and money, the key philosophical point here 
regards the First Amendment and the conditions of speech. Does the First Amendment protect the necessary and 
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occasions an exchange of promises, the two are not identical. It would be a violation of free speech to 
limit someone’s ability to promise something, but this is an entirely different matter than limiting 
someone’s ability to give money—though we can readily admit that giving money requires promises. 
Offering money and speaking/listening are such categorically different things that the limitations on 
one have nothing to do with the limitations on the other. Therefore, I disagree with Smith and Hadreas 
and the SCOTUS on philosophical grounds. Yet I can understand how, in a capitalist social formation, 
it is tempting and easy to believe Smith and Hadreas, which leads to a final point. 
 
 
Ideology 
 
The allusive ease with which Smith (and Hadreas, to some extent) writes the verb “to offer” to talk 
about arguments is a clue as to why it so sensible to do so. This ease is the same with which Smith 
claims human beings have a natural inclination to barter, truck, and exchange. Bracketing the 
attribution of truth or falsity to claims about human nature again, it is a political move to make such an 
allusion. Smith is advancing an ideology, arguing in the very terms of his utterances for a vision of 
political-economic life. The tautology or nontriviality around linking speech with money through 
equivalency and saying that discussion is an exchange of ideas comes from the same allusive impetus. 
Among the other perspectives already considered, here is another—which is ultimately a socialist 
version of Milton’s argument from sacredness: the discussion–exchange ideologeme is a result of the 
deep influence of money on Smith's liberal-capitalist imagined relation to real conditions of his 
existence, or what Louis Althusser (2014) calls ideology. Of course, if one ideologically prefers a 
political-economic arrangement where bartering, trucking, and exchanging are predominant then it 
would make sense that one would cast other activities in the same mold. Exchange becomes a gestalt. 
For example, an ideology that values technology will claim that our minds are, in reality, computers. An 
ideology that values war will talk about deploying arguments, humans being naturally aggressive, and 
talking as same thing as fighting. An ideology that values strong state power will say that humans are 
ruthless without government. And on and on. Smith’s ideology informed how he imagined the day-to-
day activities of social life, like talking and listening. He had exchange in his head. To the extent that 
this capitalist ideology—one that imagines all kinds of non-exchange-like behaviors as being exchange-
like—is a prevalent one throughout the apparatuses and institutions geared toward reproducing our 
social formation, we do the same thing. Thus emerge the educational implications of the foregoing 
analysis. 
In Marxian theory, having exchange in one’s head—when money, exchange, and commodities 
make impacts on one’s inner world—is called reification.12 Assuming that exchange in the discussion–
exchange ideologeme has a money-meaning, the proposition that discussion is an exchange of ideas is 
true, in this perspective, only to the extent that money, exchange-value, and commodities have made 
significant internal impacts on the consciousness of the speakers who utter it. Timothy Bewes (2002) 
writes that reification is thingification. Insisting that discussion is an exchange of ideas when it clearly 
                                                                                                                                               
sufficient conditions for speech, or speech itself? On the one hand, speech must happen during exchange for the 
exchange to go through. But do limits on exchanges constitute limits on speech? Do the necessary and sufficient 
conditions of X fall under the range of protections for X?  
12 See Lukacs, 1971, p. 60. 
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does not make much sense to say so is evidence of thingifying speaking and listening. Georg Lukacs 
writes that commodities can stamp their imprints on consciousness, such that even parts of the body 
become “things which [one] can ‘own’ or ‘dispose of’ like the various objects of the external world” 
(1971, p. 60). Talking and listening are a case in point here. Paulo Freire echoes this stamping process in 
his writing on the banking model of education. “[T]he person is not a conscious being (corpo consciente); 
he or she is rather the possessor of a consciousness: an empty ‘mind’ passively open to the reception of 
deposits of reality from the world outside” (1970/2000, p. 75). 
The theory of reification explains why the discussion ideologeme is both tautological and non-
trivial. On the one hand, it makes complete sense to say that discussion is an exchange of ideas. 
Exchange of ideas is just the definition of the word, the turn of phrase or idiom or metaphor with 
which we speak about discussion, or perhaps the move in the language-game of discussion. On the 
other hand, it is not trivial that discussion is said to be an exchange of ideas: it makes no sense to say 
that speaking and listening entails the sacrifice, subtraction, or trading of any resources or goods. When 
confronted with its non-triviality, one might think, “Well, discussion just is an exchange of ideas. Leave 
it at that.” This “just-isness” is one of the most important consequences of reification. The sociologist 
Martin Burris returns to Marx’s original articulation of reification, defining reification as “a form of 
social consciousness in which human relations come to be identified with the physical properties of 
things, thereby acquiring an appearance of naturalness and inevitability” (1986, p. 22). Thingification 
imbues things with a necessity, a false naturalness and solidity, that compels one to think that “it”—
whatever it is—just is what it is. Reification closes possibility, crystallizes freedom, cuts off the 
inevitable contingency of things. When activists chant “Another world is possible!” they are insisting 
that things are not just what they are, but that they could be otherwise. They are breaking reified 
notions that have been stamped and imprinted into consciousness, chipping away at the manufactured 
consent that ruling classes in the social structure have won through the reproduction of certain 
ideologies. Language is part of this reproductive process. Again, while it does not take much argument 
to show its nonsensicalness, the discussion–exchange ideologeme makes a certain sense. The 
explanation on offer for this nonsensical sensibility is widespread reification, and the maintenance of 
consent to capitalist ideology.13  
Returning to the Freire passage above, the educational implications become clearer. A consummate 
philosopher of education, what Freire points to in this passage is that stamping and imprinting 
consciousness is educational work. When we think of conscious beings as having empty minds that can 
be filled with deposits, when we talk about heads, minds, bodies, talking in terms of deposits, we are 
violating the integrity of those things. The violation of their integrity harkens back to Milton’s claim 
that treating truth, knowledge, and discussion as exchangeable infringes on their sacredness. Freire 
might argue that students’ humanity is at stake, and that any reifying utterance threatens such violation 
and infringement. I would extend Milton’s argument politically as well, which Freire I imagine would 
permit. A reifying utterance which thingifies discussion promotes a social formation, capitalism, that I 
believe to be unjust and oppressive. Uttering propositions that imagine discussion as exchange 
                                                
13 Human capital theorists will be familiar with claims such as these, and will most likely shrug and ask, “So 
what?” Drawing from Theodore Schultz’s landmark speech introducing human capital theory, where Schultz 
considers the reasons why economists before 1964 did not consider human knowledge, skills, and behavior as 
“capital,” one reply is that intuitively understanding speaking and listening as an economic activity is “an insult to 
dignity.” The claim about teaching reification by saying discussion is an exchange of ideas is token of that type: it 
is an insult to dignity (Schultz, 1972). 
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reproduces that social formation. In a small way, it maintains and manufactures consent to a capitalist’s 
imagined relation to real conditions.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
As educators, writers, researchers, intellectuals—as speakers whose words matter—we therefore have 
an obligation to speak responsibly. Volosinov (1973) calls for exactly this kind of responsibility in his 
Marxism and the Philosophy of Language. If words determine and are determined by the social-political 
conditions surrounding their utterance, if language impacts society like water impacts land, then as 
speakers we have an obligation to propagate the society we want. Our livelihoods are made through 
close attention to words. The implication is that we have a responsibility to recognize that our language 
is ideological and to speak in ways that promote the ideologies to which we subscribe, and, just as 
importantly, to not speak in ways that promote ideologies that threaten and infringe the sacredness, 
humanity, and integrity of our students. This obligation holds both for the sake of students’ 
consciousness, in Freire’s sense, and for the social formation that we reproduce when we speak, in 
Althusser’s. In other words, we must recognize the ideological quality of our language and—to use a 
term from Althusser—that our speech interpellates our readers and students. What we teach when we 
say that discussion is an exchange of ideas is that things like discussion are equivalent to market 
transactions. We shore up the capitalist ideology; helping, in an everyday way, to manufacture consent 
to the ideology. Certainly there are other avenues for reification to take hold, and those avenues should 
be the subjects of other essays. This article has focused on one small instance—small yet powerful 
because it is small: saying that discussion is an exchange of ideas. While mundane and common-
sensical, I believe that calling attention to such things hidden in plain sight has a significant intellectual 
impact: first because it is clearly within our individual purviews to speak differently, and second because 
analyzing such mundane utterances can lead to revelations about other ideologemes, and ultimately 
social formations.  
As academics, we teach when we speak. In a narrow way, the educational implications of this 
analysis fall mainly on our shoulders as we write our articles, books, and essays and as we speak with 
our students. But in a broad way, the implications of this essay also fall on anyone interested in 
reproducing ideologies that are not exchange-based, committed to promoting imaginations of real 
existence that do not privilege buying and selling. Those interested in creating another social world 
should speak like it. Returning to the passages listed at the outset of the article, the discussion–exchange 
ideologeme is present in the political unconscious of each of them. Speaking responsibly requires 
becoming conscious of this political unconscious, asking authors to wonder whether it is right to 
imagine the real conditions of discussion as an exchange of ideas—whether that teaches the right 
lesson. Will we reify and reproduce capitalist ideology, or challenge it by rooting it out of what we can 
clearly control: what we say? As the legal scholar Wright (1976) wrote, one’s response reveals what one 
is willing to teach. 
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